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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent local attempts to increase the production of low income
housing in the United States reinforce the adage that necessity is the
mother of invention. The sharp decline in federal programs has forced
local authorities to bear the social and political burden of inadequate
housing for the poor. Therefore, it is no surprise that the innovation
which had characterized federal housing legislation has been replaced
by inventiveness among local authorities.
Many cities are searching for ways to fill the void left by the decline
of federal programs. Since local authorities traditionally control most
land development, the search for low income housing has turned to the
link between real estate development and the supply of affordable hous-
ing. Some cities are already implementing a variety of new and innova-
tive approaches along these lines, while others have placed the housing
issue on their agenda. Since the problem of insufficient low income
housing is a continuing one, more cities and states will address this
issue in the near future.
The emergence of linkage is typical of how American land use poli-
cies and methods are developed. Because the Constitution mandates a
separation of powers between federal and state levels with land use
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planning typically falling within the jurisdiction of the states, most new
land use controls emerge from the states. Because state level initiative
often proves weak, much room is left for local action. Thus, most in-
novations in American land use planning, including zoning itself, arose
out of local experiments. This process of land use development differs
from that of many other countries, where land use planning legislation
is most frequently shaped nationally.1
The bottom-up process is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it al-
lows for variety and innovation, with fifty different legal entities, and
within them thousands of local authorities, all acting like idea genera-
tors capable of puffing up new concepts and methods of testing them
locally. Once born, these ideas undergo a survival of the fittest process,
competing for national, professional and legal attention through the
various media for idea exchange. This process ensures that only the
more transferable and robust policies survive. This process of innova-
tion may involve an influx of new ideas whose attractiveness does not
correlate with efficacy. Popular appeal may be gained at the expense of
careful up-front evaluations. Comparatively, other countries require
single-opportunity national policies to pass through the national legis-
lative and administrative sieves. In the United States there appears to
be no custodian to evaluate local policies which have the potential to
set important national precedents.
This article proposes a partial remedy for this shortcoming in the
innovation process. Rather than waiting for results of ex post facto
evaluations of linkage, this article proposes that many facets of linkage
can be evaluated today. After surveying both existing and proposed
policies, the article evaluates existing programs in terms of their legal-
ity, capacity to deliver lower income housing, and their broader public
policy implications from economic, social, and planning perspectives.
A. Definition of Housing Linkage
Linkage, or linked development, is a policy that taps a currently bur-
geoning type of land use, such as commercial development, in order to
finance the construction of housing or to promote some other social
need such as job training or employment. Stated differently, linkage is
1. For a more complete analysis of the context for the emergence of U.S. land use
law and policy see Alterman, Exactions American Style: The Context for Evaluation, in
PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES: EVALUATION OF REAL ESTATE EXACTIONS,
LmiKAGE, AND ALTERNATIVE LAND POLICIES 3 (R. Alterman ed. 1988) [hereinafter
R. Alterman].
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land use regulation that requires or induces certain developers to con-
struct or help finance needed housing, often "affordable" housing, as a
condition for receiving permission to build or to obtain some "bonus."
2
Therefore, linkage requires that a builder intending to build X, must
also build or help finance Y.
The history of this new and rapidly developing field is relatively
brief. The most prevalent type of linkage is between downtown office
developments and low or moderate income housing. San Francisco
and Boston are the best known examples, with San Francisco being the
recognized pioneer. Recently, planners in several cities have suggested
various ways of broadening the concept of linkage. These changes af-
fect both the "donor," or generator, and the "recipient," or target.
B. Roots in Exactions and Inclusionary Zoning
Linkage programs can be viewed as an extension of two other meth-
ods of land use control: exactions and inclusionary zoning.' As the
historic survey by R. Marlin Smith demonstrates,4 states and local gov-
ernments have used exactions for several decades. An exaction re-
quires developers to supply or finance public facilities or amenities
made necessary by the proposed development, including infrastructure,
parks, and schools. Linkage is an extension of the developer's responsi-
bility to provide for public needs with services that are not public facili-
ties, such as housing and social services.
The use of exactions has been increasing in recent years.5 Although
2. Some take a narrower view of linkage, identifying it only with mandatory re-
quirements. See Keating, Linking Downtown Policy in Three Cities, 52 J. AM. PLAN. A.
133 (1986); and Kayden and Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions
Analysir" The Connection Between Office Development and Housing, 50 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 127, 128 (1987). Others, however, construe linkage more broadly and
include incentive-based programs as welf. See D. PORTER, DowNToWN LINKAGES
(The Urban Land Institute, 1985) [hereinafter D. PoRTER]; Juergensmeyer, The Legal
Issues of Capital Facilities Funding, in R. Alterman, supra note 1, at 53 [hereinafter
Juegensmeyer]; Merriam and Andrews, Defensible Linkage, 54 J. AM. PLAN. A. 199
(1988).
3. The degree to which linkage can draw upon the legal rationale for these two
mechanisms is a separate question which will be addressed later. See infra notes 56-105
and accompanying text.
4. Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit As-
sessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1987).
5. A survey of 452 communities in 1985 is cited in Fulton, Exactions Put to the Test,
53 PLANNING COMMENT 6 (1987), and fully reported in DEVELOPMENT EXAcTiONS
(J. Frank & R. Rhodes ed. 1987). Another survey is reported in Bauman and Ethier,
1988]
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traditionally exactions required the dedication of land for a limited
range of public services, exactions currently allow for the collection of
fees in lieu of either land or the actual construction of the facility in
question. Their use has been extended beyond the provision of on-site
facilities to include off-site facilities made necessary by the develop-
ment. Additionally, the more recent sophisticated version of exactions
such as impact fees are increasingly being used to translate needs en-
tirely into more flexible monetary terms for financing public facilities.6
The evolution of exactions and the emergence of impact fees have
provided linkage with a precedent for imposing monetary fees while
relaxing the need for location proximity. Linkage plans usually rely on
a fee payment option with an in-kind option as well, and do not require
the mandated housing to be provided on-site. Another regulatory
scheme, environmental impact review, has also indirectly supported
the idea of off-site responsibility.
"Inclusionary zoning" or "inclusionary housing" has served as the
second important stepping stone for linkage policies by placing the is-
sue of the supply of low and moderate income housing on the legisla-
tive agenda. Inclusionary zoning was originally proposed as a method
to alleviate the phenomenon of exclusionary zoning which arose from
the misuse of zoning.7 Although the distinction between inclusionary
zoning and linkage is often blurred,' they are distinct concepts.
Inclusionary zoning attempts to socially integrate residential areas.
Linkage policies, on the other hand, are essentially methods for allocat-
ing responsibility for supplying housing or social services. While
linkage policies usually require nonresidential development to provide
for housing or other social services, inclusionary zoning is primarily
concerned with residential land uses.
Despite these differences, the two distinct policies share an impor-
tant component. The decline in federal housing assistance programs
Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1987).
6. For analyses of this evolutionary process, see Connors and High, The Expanding
Circle of Exactions: From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 69
(1987); Juergensmeyer, supra note 2; R. Alterman, supra note 1.
7. For a comprehensive discussion of inclusionary zoning, see A. MALLACH, IN-
CLUSIONARY HousiNG PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1984) [hereinafter A.
MALLACH].
8. This point of view is expressed in INCLUSIONARY ZONING MOVES DOWNTOWN
(D. Merriam, D.J. Brower, P.D. Tegeler eds. 1985) [hereinafter INCLUSIONARY
ZONING].
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has made it necessary for planners in some cities to incorporate a sup-
ply-responsibility component or in-lieu fees into inclusionary zoning.
Such schemes typically require or encourage a developer to set aside a
specific proportion of the development as low or moderate income
housing units for some length of time. This aspect of inclusionary zon-
ing is indeed close to the notion of linkage. However, the starting point
is different and the legal implications appear distinctive as well.
C. Description of Existing or Proposed Linkage Programs
Approximately a dozen cities in various parts of the country are al-
ready implementing linkage programs, while others are considering
whether to adopt such policies. Since this is a growing field, the author
may be unaware of some examples; however, the most prominent pro-
posed or approved cases are discussed in this article.
The information about the programs presented in this article is based
on both primary and secondary evidence. The primary evidence
presented is based on firsthand interviews and an analysis of the legisla-
tion in the following seven cities: San Francisco, Boston, New York,
Chicago, Madison, Hartford (partial), and Stamford (partial).9 Three
major examples of linkage-San Francisco, Boston, and New York-
will be discussed in great detail; two are in existence, the third was
proposed and rejected. Secondary evidence is derived from the litera-
ture provided about programs in Princeton and Jersey City, New
Jersey; Palo Alto and Santa Monica, California; Miami, Florida; Seat-
tle, Washington; and Cambridge, Massachusetts. °
Five types of linkage programs are identified in this article:
mandatory; quasi-mandatory, incentive-based, negotiated, and "re-
verse" linkage. A representative case for each type of linkage is in-
cluded in the text, in addition to a reference to New York; the others
are presented in the Appendix."1 The nature of the evidence (primary
9. The author did not undertake empirical research directly measuring outputs and
impacts.
10. The major secondary source is a report prepared for the Urban Land Institute
(U.L.I.) by Douglas Porter in 1985. Mr. Porter has kindly provided the author with
update sheets for the cities included in the 1985 report, correct for January 1987 and, in
some cases, a month or two later. See D. PORTER, supra note 2, at 2. A similar version
of Porter's 1985 paper also appeared in URBAN LAND 16 (Sept. 1985). The update
sheets may be obtained by contacting Mr. Porter at the Urban Land Institute, or the
author. Other secondary sources are cited where relevant.
11. Other cities which have considered or adopted mandatory or quasi-mandatory
linkage policies are described in the Appendix. These cities include: Chicago, where
1988]
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or secondary) is indicated in each case, along with citations of the
sources.
II. LINKAGE PROGRAMS
A. Formula-Based Mandatory and Quasi-Mandatory Programs
1. Mandatory Linkiage: San Francisco
Established in 1980, the San Francisco program was the pioneer
linkage program. Initially called the Office/Affordable Housing Pro-
duction Program, the city created it by an administrative decision,
which cited the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as au-
thorization.12 CEQA called for "mitigation measures" to be imposed
when an adverse impact is anticipated.' 3 Before 1981, these mitigation
measures were interpreted to include socially oriented measures.
Amendments to CEQA in 1981 and 1982 allowed mitigation meas-
ures to address only physical environmental effects. For several years
subsequent to the 1981-82 amendments, the planning commission re-
lied on its discretionary powers in granting building permits.14 Seeking
a solid legislative basis for its program, San Francisco used its home
rule authority to enact in August 1985 the Office/Affordable Housing
Production Program. The ordinance amends the Subdivision Code
contained in the San Francisco Municipal Code. 5
Seeking to prevent legal challenges, San Francisco's decision makers
sought to validate their linkage policy by a study documenting the
causal link between the construction of new office space and an in-
creased need for housing. The city commissioned two studies. The
1979 study attempted to provide an initial quantitative estimate of the
linkage was a significant issue on the mayoral election platform and is still hotly de-
bated; Princeton, N.J.; Palo Alto, Ca.; and Stamford, Conn. Santa Monica, Ca. has a
special mandatory-negotiated version and will be discussed with the negotiated
programs.
12. Wns-es ANN. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 et seq. (1970).
13. CEQA defined a significant impact on the environment, requiring mitigation, as
a "substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment." WEsT's
ANN. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21068 and 21002.1(b).
14. The history of the San Francisco program is presented in detail by Diamond,
The San Francisco Office/Housing Program: Social Policy Underwritten by Private En-
terprise, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 449-86 (1983). See also Share and Diamond, San
Francisco's Office-Housing Production Program, 35 LAND USE LAw 4 (Oct. 1983).
15. Ordinance No. 358-85, City and County of San Francisco, Office/Affordable
Housing Production Program (File No. 115-85-10).
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demand for housing generated by new office space.16 A second study
in 1984 is cited by the 1985 ordinance as the factual basis for linkage
requirements.
San Francisco's linkage requirement applies to office development
anywhere in the city that adds 50,000 square feet or more of new or
substantially rehabilitated office space. The 1984 study concluded that
to provide affordable housing for the demand generated by new office
development would impose a cost of $9.47 to $10.47 on each square
foot of office development. The city, however, used a figure of $5.34.
The program has a housing requirement that mandates that 38.6 units
per 100,000 square feet of office space be provided.17
A developer can elect either to build the housing, or to pay an in-lieu
fee. If the developer elects to build, it must allocate 62% of the hous-
ing units derived from the above-stated formula to low or moderate
income housing for 20 years. The ordinance creates an elaborate sys-
tem to ensure that these requirements are met, but fails to distinguish
between low and moderate income housing. If, on the other hand, the
developer makes an in-lieu payment, the money is placed in a City
Wide Affordable Housing Fund established by the ordinance to be
spent exclusively on low and moderate income housing. The developer
is required to render full payment before a certificate of occupancy will
be issued. The ordinance apparently estimates that the developer's
subsidy per housing unit is $13,834. This figure is relied upon where
reimbursements are due, or where a combination of the construction
and the in-lieu fee is elected."8
16. The report was prepared by Sedway Cooke for the Department of City Plan-
ning. See Diamond, supra note 14.
17. In its earlier version, the San Francisco program called for a complex system of
credit weights that depended on the type of housing commitment made (new or rehabil-
itated; low or moderate income, etc.). Low income housing received higher credits.
The previous system, although mandatory, allowed for some negotiation. It has been
replaced by a simpler across-the-board mandatory formula. See Diamond, supra note
14.
Some argue that negotiation still predominates the determination of the construction
in-kind requirement. See Susskind, McMahon, Tolm, and Rolley, Mitigating Adverse
Development Impacts" Case Studies of Seven Linkage Programs, PROGRAM ON NEGOTI-
ATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, WORKING PAPER SERIES, May 1986 [hereinafter
Susskind]. Also see Susskind and McMahon, Refraining the Rationale for Downtown
Linkage Programs, in R. Alterman, supra note 1, at 203 [hereinafter Susskind and
McMahon].
18. See supra note 15 (subsection dealing with "compliance through combination of
construction or payment of in-lieu fee").
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San Francisco's 1985 downtown plan calls for payments of fees by
office developers in addition to the housing fee. The money collected is
to subsidize public art, open spaces, child care, and transit, for a total
of $13 per square foot. The plan also places a ceiling on the total
amount of new office space allowed downtown. 9 As the longest run-
ning programs enacted, the San Francisco case will be of particular
interest in the author's evaluation below.
2. Quasi-Mandatory Linkage: Boston
The second major program enacted was modeled after the San Fran-
cisco program but with several important differences. Boston's linkage
policy is quasi-mandatory because it applies to anyone requesting zon-
ing relief, including a variance, conditional use permit, or zoning
change. Boston established its program in December of 1983, through
an amendment to the Boston Zoning Code. Another amendment in
February 1986 reduced the payment period for the in-lieu fee, in effect
raising the fee.20
Unlike the San Francisco program, which applies to any project fall-
ing within its specifications, the Boston program applies only to cases
where deviation from the existing zoning is sought.21 The developer of
any project of more than 100,000 square feet requiring zoning relief
must prepare a Development Impact Project Plan to be reviewed by
the Boston Rehabilitation Authority (BRA). The language of the Bos-
ton legislation clearly indicates the attempt to ground the linkage pro-
gram in a regulatory mode associated with planning review, rather
than in a fee or tax-like mode.
Similar to the San Francisco program, the Boston program has a
threshold requirement. The linkage requirement applies only to addi-
tional space above the threshold, so that a building of 150,000 square
feet will be charged only for the 50,000 square feet above the 100,000
square foot threshold. The fee, called a Housing Contribution Grant,
19. October 1986, update sheet to the Urban Land Institute report, supra note 10.
20. The first amendment establishing a linkage program in Boston was Text
Amendment No. 73 to the Boston Zoning Code, which added Article 26 and became
effective December 1983. The second amendment occurred in February 1986. Copies
of the relevant legislation and other information from the Boston Redevelopment Au-
thority (BRA) were provided by the courtesy of Ms. Edith Netter, then Senior Counsel
to the BRA These copies are on file with the author.
21. In Boston, existing zoning is such that almost every downtown development
will receive zoning relief.
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is $5.00 per square foot, with an additional $1.00 fee per square foot for
job training added by a 1986 amendment to the zoning code.
Subsequent to its enactment, the Boston program sought to place its
required fee on firmer factual grounds. A 1986 study commissioned by
the BRA calculates that new office construction and the office employ-
ees accompanying the projects would increase housing costs in the city
by $11.28 per square foot of new office space.22 The money collected
by the program is to be placed in the Neighborhood Housing Trust
Fund, which is administered by the Office of the Collector General.
As in San Francisco, the developer in Boston has an option of elect-
ing either the Housing Creation Option, or the monetary Housing Con-
tribution Option. Boston makes no attempt to calculate the
requirement in terms of number of housing units. If a developer
chooses the construction option, the cost of the units constructed must
be at least equivalent to the sum of the contribution required by the
program had the developer elected the contribution option. Unlike San
Francisco, both options require that the housing units be designated
solely for low or moderate income households. The program fails to
distinguish between these two categories.
Other significant differences exist between the current programs in
the two cities. Unlike the San Francisco model, which applies only to
net office space, the Boston program applies to a wide range of land
uses, including: office, retail business and service, institutional, educa-
tional (excluding any public institutions), and hotels and motels (with
the exception of apartment hotels). An often overlooked feature of the
Boston program is that, in addition to the aforementioned types of de-
velopments, the ordinance could at times apply to residential or other
land uses not falling under the rubric of Development Impact Uses. A
fee may be imposed on a land use project that directly reduced the
supply of low and moderate income dwelling units.23 For example, the
developers of new or rehabilitated luxury apartment blocks at times
displace lower income residents and therefore could be required to
make the statutory contribution. This provision thus serves to intro-
duce an inclusionary zoning-like element into the program.
The Boston program further differs from its predecessor by making a
22. A report titled The Linkage Between Office Development and Housing Costs in
the City of Boston was prepared by Jerold S. Kayden, K. Case and R. Pollard for the
BRA. A copy of the report was provided by Mr. Kayden and Ms. Netter.
23. See the Boston linkage legislation supra note 20, at § 26A-3 titled Development
Impact Project Requirements, and § 26A-2 titled Definitions.
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
14 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:3
geographic distinction between the downtown area and the surround-
ing neighborhoods. Based on this distinction, the 1986 amendment
changes the payment period from twelve years anywhere in town, to
seven years if the project is located in the downtown area. In effect, the
Boston contribution is significantly lower than $5.00 per square foot of
new or rehabilitated space. For example, with a discount rate of 10%,
the five dollars would be worth $1.58 in present value for the twelve
year payment period, and $3.83 for the seven year period.24 A geo-
graphic distinction is also made with respect to where the funds are to
be spent. If feasible, 10% of the funds collected from downtown
projects are to be reserved for downtown, and 20% of the funds raised
in the other areas are to be reserved for the adjacent neighborhoods.
The balance of the funds can be spent anywhere in the city.
Although Boston bases its program on San Francisco's, there are
several significant differences. In effect, the Boston in-lieu fee is consid-
erably lower than San Francisco's because of the extended payment
period and the higher threshold. However, the Boston program has a
broader range of land use "donors," and thus a broader tax base on
which to impose linkage requirements. Finally, in Boston, unlike San
Francisco, the program is linked to the city's discretionary planning
review and has a geographically differentiated component.
A new version of linkage-parcel-to-parcel linkage-was instituted
in Boston in 1986. This program applies to publicly owned downtown
parcels only, linking their disposition to publicly owned parcels in des-
ignated neighborhoods. The same quantitative requirements apply as
in "regular" linkage.25
New York City
In 1984, New York City's Mayor Koch appointed the Development
Commitments Study Commission at the request of the American Plan-
ning Association and community housing groups. The commission
considered and rejected proposals for a linkage exaction program simi-
lar to that of San Francisco and Boston.26 A senior official interviewed
24. The calculation is presented in a BRA information sheet titled Questions and
Answers on the Linkage Program.
25. See supra note 10. See also Herbers, Linking Good Deeds to Development:
Whose Good Deal Is It? GOVERNING PROTOTYPE 28 (1987).
26. Report to the Mayor of the Development Commitments Study Commission,
July 1984. For a description of the background that led to the appointment of the
commission, see Werth, Tapping Developers, 50 PLANNING 21 (January 1984) and Teg-
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affirmed that the City Planning department still holds this position.27
To justify its rejection of linkage, the commission maintains:
Zoning regulations and specific zoning decisions should not be
tied to income generation for general public purposes. The study
commission believes that such a practice, even if directed toward a
worthy objective such as housing, would distort the purpose of
zoning and could have a damaging effect.... If the real estate
market, particularly that of Manhattan, is to be tapped to provide
necessary monies for a housing trust fund, then the obligation
should take the form of a tax to be imposed uniformly on a broad
base of real estate activity, not solely on projects requiring discre-
tionary zoning actions.
Although it rejected a linkage exaction, the commission recom-
mended the creation of a Housing Trust Fund, through a variety of
proposed revenue sources. As of the writing of this article, that fund
has not been created and only a tax on condominium sales exists.2"
However, it is possible that the city currently possesses the authority to
impose housing exactions through the environmental impact statement
required of developers seeking discretionary zoning actions which will
have a significant environmental impact.29 Such impact could be ex-
panded to include effects on the character of the neighborhood or
community.
3. "Reversed" Mandatory Linkage-Madison, Wisconsin
An interesting twist to typical linkage policy programs can be found
in a resolution proposed by an alderman for Madison, Wisconsin. Un-
like the economically vibrant urban centers of San Francisco and Bos-
ton, Madison has a demographically weak downtown and a slowly
developing periphery-a pattern typical of many American cities. The
proposed resolution is to create "a linkage program to increase city fees
in order to generate revenues to assist housing and economic develop-
ment in the central city neighborhoods., 30 Various types of additional
eler, Developer Payments and Downtown Housing Trust Funds, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE
REVIEW, November Special Issue, 679 (1984).
27. Interview with Mr. Carl Weisbrod, Executive Director of the Department of
City Planning, New York City, December 1986.
28. See supra note 27.
29. See Marcus, Development Exactions: The Emerging Law of New York State, in
R. Alterman, supra note 1, at 78-79.
30. Resolution submitted to the City Council of Madison by Alderman Billy
Feitlinger: Resolution 225-86, Creating a Linkage Program to Increase City Fees in
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fees would be exacted against new developments outside the target
area. The staff comments on this proposal anticipate grater problems
in proving the causal connection with this form of "reverse" linkage
than with the more typical office-to-housing form utilized by other
cities.
B. Incentive-Based Programs
Several cities have adopted an incentive system that allows develop-
ers to apply for a greater density, or another type of bonus, in exchange
for building affordable housing or an in-lieu fee. Such bonuses are an
extension of the incentive zoning systems that exist in many cities,
which require developers to provide amenities such as open space or
plazas. Often, the housing exactions are part of a package that in-
cludes these other, more conventional exactions.31
Hartford, Connecticut
Hartford considered various proposals for establishing linkage for
housing and employment, including a mandatory, formula-based
linkage requirement for commercial projects over 10,000 square feet.32
After much debate,33 Hartford revised its bonus system in 1986 and
instituted a bonus-based linkage system.34 The "schedule of bonuses"
offers additional floor space in exchange for a variety of facilities and
improvements, each with its own price tag. Residential uses are offered
the highest bonus ratio of 1:8, and employment uses-i:6.25. For
comparison-day care centers and nurseries are offered a ratio of 1:6;
cultural and entertainment facilities and pedestrian circulation im-
Order to Generate Revenues to Assist Housing and Economic Development in the Central
City Neighborhoods. Staff comments by the city attorney, October 1986, provided by
Alderman Feitlinger.
31. Reported examples of such programs include Hartford, Miami, and Seattle.
The Hartford program will be presented as an example. The other programs appear in
the Appendix.
32. The proposed mandatory linkage and the deliberations that led to it are re-
ported by Susskind, supra note 17.
33. Stockard and Engler, Inc., Linkage Policy for Hartford, June 1985. This con-
sultant's report recommended a tax on commercial office use as well as other
alternatives.
34. Information supplied by Ms. Brenda L. Valla of the University of Florida
Growth Management Studies, based on communication with the Hartford Assistant
City Manager, Mr. Michael Brown, and attorneys Joseph Lugo and Lisa Silverstre of
the Hartford City Attorney's office, April 1987.
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provements-1:4; historical preservation-l:2. The 1986 amendment
established a fee payment option for residential or employment uses
and for job training that calls for a payment of $5 per square foot of
bonus floor area into a Linkage Trust Fund.35
New York City
In mid-1987 New York City amended its zoning code to create an
inclusionary housing program containing elements of incentive-based
linkage. The program grants bonuses in the form of higher floor area
ratios in certain zoning districts in exchange for the construction or
rehabilitation of lower income housing or the payment of a fee desig-
nated for low and moderate income housing.3 6 In a way, this policy
combines inclusionary zoning and linkage. Since its geographic specifi-
cation of a half-mile radius indicates that its goal is to create housing
rather than integrated neighborhoods, the program is not inclusionary
zoning. It could perhaps be called a "housing-to-housing" linkage.
C. Negotiated Linkage
Linkage programs, whether mandatory or incentive-based, are not
always expressed by a preset formula. At times, they are negotiated on
an ad hoc basis. Although this form of linkage raises various legal
questions, the nature of the development regulation system is such that
negotiated linkage is likely to persevere. Indeed, Susskind and McMa-
hon37 favor negotiated linkage over the formula-based version. As may
be expected, there is a dearth of information about negotiated linkage,
and it is likely that more examples exist than have been reported.
Known examples include Jersey City, New Jersey; Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts; and the special mandatory-negotiated version of Santa
Monica, California."
Since 1985 Jersey City has encouraged developers of retail and com-
mercial projects to construct or rehabilitate housing units, to aid in
35. CITY OF HARTFORD MUN. CODE ch. 35, § 35-5.46, amendment submitted to
the Court of Common Council on April 28, 1986. Porter reports that a mandatory
employment requirement was established for publicly assisted projects, requiring the
employment of Hartford residents, minorities, and female tradeworkers. See Porter,
update sheet, supra note 10.
36. Section 23-92 of New York City's Zoning Resolution was approved by the City
Planning Commission on April 1, 1987, and shortly thereafter received final approval.
37. Susskind and McMahon, supra note 17.
38. Porter, supra note 10.
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financing affordable housing projects, or to contribute to a housing
fund. The state agency that implements this policy has quantitative
guidelines for these contributions: 10% of housing units should be "af-
fordable," and commercial and industrial developers of over 100,000
square feet should contribute $3.25 per square foot. Construction of
affordable housing reduces this requested contribution to sixty-five
cents.
39
In Cambridge, since 1985 the city has considered several ordinances
that require linkage payments. Meanwhile, the city is negotiating on a
case-by-case basis with major developers of all land uses for housing
contributions.'
Beyond these reported examples are probably many cases that may
not have surfaced as full-fledged policy. For example, in New York
City one or two cases have been reported where off-site housing was
exacted from mixed developments.41
A special case is Santa Monica, California, where a mandatory
linkage program not codified is implemented through a special feature
of California law called "developer agreements." These agreements al-
low municipalities to sign binding agreements with developers that pro-
tect the developers from future changes in the municipality's policies.42
The linkage policy calls for fees of $2.25 per square foot for the first
15,000 square feet of net rentable space, and $5.00 per square foot for
the remainder. Units may be constructed in kind at a value equal to
the in-lieu fees.43
The list of programs presented here and in the Appendix shows a
number of innovative ideas. Linkage-type proposals seem to be slowly
emerging from isolated local experiments to a nationally discussed pol-
icy issue. Yet, how desirable is linkage in general and particular forms
39. Id.
40. Id. In summer 1988 Cambridge approved incentive-based linkage.
41. Reported in Exhibit C. appended to the Development Commitments Study
Commission Report, supra note 26.
42. For an analysis of developer agreements in California, with some reference to
Santa Monica, see Cowart, Negotiating Exactions through Development Agreements, in
R. Alterman, supra note 1, at 219. For an analysis of developer agreements in compari-
son to Britain's "planning gain," see Callies, Developers'Agreements and Planning Gain,
17 THE URn. LAW. 599 (1985).
43. Secondary sources for Santa Monica are: Porter, 1985 Report and Update
Sheets, supra note 10; Susskind and McMahon, supra note 17, at 204; Keating, supra
note 2.
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of it? Section D will note the main variations among the programs
reported and will outline contextual variables to be taken into account
in considering linkage policy. This discussion will serve as the back-
ground for an evaluation of linkage in Part III. The paper will con-
clude with a proposed alternative rationale for linkage.
D. Variations Among Linkage Programs
The existing and proposed programs have some important variations
among them. These differences can be summarized along the following
dimensions:
1. Dimensions for Comparison
* Types of Donors and Recipient Services: There are many types of
developments that could be donors. The following is a list of donors
used by various programs: office development (San Francisco and Se-
attle programs; Chicago and Stamford proposals); other non-residen-
tial developments (Boston, Miami, Palo Alto, Santa Monica, Seattle);
industrial development (Palo Alto); upper income housing (Boston,
New York City); any land use (Cambridge, Jersey City). None of the
programs studied includes government-operated services as possible
donors.
There are a variety of recipient services: housing (New York City,
Stamford proposal, Jersey City, Palo Alto, Santa Monica); job training
(Boston and Hartford); daycare, public art, transit (San Francisco and
Hartford); economic development (Chicago and Madison proposals).
* Location of Donors and Recipients: Despite the image of linkage,
downtown-only location of the donors is not necessarily the dominant
option. The donor development may be citywide (San Francisco, Bos-
ton and others) or specifically in nondowntown areas (Madison
proposal).
The location of the recipients varies: citywide (San Francisco and
Boston); only particular neighborhoods (Miami, Chicago, Madison);
within a specified radius (Miami-the off-site housing zone; New York
City-inlusionary housing off-site option); recipients located down-
town or in adjacent areas (Seattle; Madison proposal). In most cases,
the program applies uniformly to recipients in all eligible districts, but
Boston and Miami distinguish among geographic areas.
* Mandatory, Bonus-based, or Negotiated:" Does the requirement
44. For a distinction among mandatory, incentive-based, and negotiated programs
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apply to anyone requesting permission to develop, or only if a devel-
oper seeks a bonus? Is the policy preset, or negotiated case by case?
The San Francisco program is the only approved mandatory program
in a major city. Other mandatory programs are in smaller cities (Palo
Alto, Princeton, and the unapproved Stamford, Connecticut, propo-
sal). Several cities have opted for an incentive-based system (Hartford,
Seattle, Miami). The Boston program is quasi-mandatory because
although its program is mandatory it applies only if the developer seeks
zoning relief or a special permit. The bonuses referred to above are
established in the ordinance. Linkage may also be negotiated case by
case and may lead to an agreement with the developer, as occurred in
Cambridge, Jersey City, and Santa Monica.
* Types of Housing Targeted: Does the program allow any type of
housing to be built or financed (San Francisco in the initial years), or
does it require construction of low and moderate income housing only?
Within the "affordable" housing category is there specific targeting to
low income housing through requirements or incentives? Most pro-
grams lack this distinction. In San Francisco, the initial program dif-
ferentiated between types of housing through a weighted credits
system. In many cases, "affordable" housing is defined using national
"section 8" criteria of fair rent,"5 and lower income households are
defined as having an income of 80 percent of SMSA limits.4 6
* In Kind or In-lieu Fee: Does the program call for a fee or actual
construction of housing, or for both? Most programs allow the devel-
oper to choose between the two options, but some have a fee option
only (Princeton; the Chicago proposal).47
* New Construction or Rehabilitation: Some programs, including
San Francisco and Boston, specifically allow substantially rehabilitated
units to count as new construction. Other programs fail to define "con-
struction" clearly. Infrequently, a program gives the developer the op-
tion of less-substantial rehabilitation. An exception is New York City's
1987 inclusionary housing program that has both a substantial rehabili-
tation option and a "preservation" option.
see Alterman and Kayden, Developer Provision of Public Benefits: Toward a Consensus
Vocabulary, in R. Alterman, supra note 1, at 22.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(2) for a definition, and legislative purpose in so defin-
ing, low income households.
46. See, e.g., NEW YORK CrrY ZONING RESOLUTIoN, supra note 36, at § 23-92
(defining New York City's Inclusionary Housing program).
47. The Chicago reports proposing linkage are unclear as to whether a construction
option exists or not.
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* Threshold: San Francisco, Boston, Santa Monica, and two pro-
posed programs (Chicago and Stamford) have thresholds below which
a development is totally exempt, ranging from 15,000 to 100,000
square feet.4" Among the programs surveyed, only the Princeton pro-
gram applies to all nonresidential development regardless of size.49
Most of the thresholds have a single cutoff point between the exempt
and nonexempt levels. The exceptions are Princeton, with a graded
formula, and Santa Monica, with a two-tier system, with a lower fee for
the first 15,000 square feet and a higher fee for anything over that.,
Programs such as Boston, San Francisco5" and the proposed Chicago
program charge only on the area above the threshold, exempting every-
thing else in both large and small projects. In other cities, including
Santa Monica, if a development exceeds the threshold, the entire pro-
ject is assessed. Bonus-based programs have a threshold arising from
the bonus level, which differs from city to city and among zones.
* Level of Fee: Existing mandatory and quasi-mandatory programs
have housing fees that range from approximately $2.43 in Palo Alto to
$5.34 in San Francisco per square foot of developed space. The pro-
posed mandatory programs are higher-$6 for Stamford and $10 for
Chicago. Reported bonus-based and negotiated programs range from
$2.25 as the lower of the two fees in Santa Monica, to a maximum of
$15 in part of Seattle. The existing mandatory and bonus-based fees
cluster at 4 to 5 dollars. However, not all these figures are comparable
and some may be misleading because the actual value of the fees de-
pends on the particular details of the programs, such as payment peri-
ods. These range from 0 (up-front payment required in San Francisco
and Hartford), through 4 and 7 years (Chicago proposal; downtown
Boston), to 12 years (the nondowntown option in Boston).
* Earmarking and Designation Through a Trust Fund: Most linkage
programs specifically designate the funds collected for a specific type of
housing. Many are tied to a formal trust fund. In most cases, the legis-
lation or written policy indicates that fees are to be deposited in that
fund.
48. San Francisco: 50,000 square feet; Boston: 100,000; Santa Monica: 15,000;
Chicago: 50,000; Stamford: 30,000.
49. Susskind and McMahon, supra note 17, at 204.
50. The San Francisco legislation is unclear on whether the ordinance imposes the
fee on the first 50,000 square feet in projects over that threshold.
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2. Conclusions from the Comparison
The existing programs are similar in their technical and quantitative
aspects (adoption of thresholds; fees/construction options; fee levels;
criteria for defining "affordable housing"). For example, most existing
fee levels are around $5 per square foot, and vary less than one would
expect from the actual differences among the cities in type of develop-
ment, building costs, and the amount of housing needs actually gener-
ated by the new development. There is also a virtual consensus on the
quantitative criteria for defining eligible households and on the lack of
differentiation between low and moderate income housing. There are,
however, significant differences regarding the qualitative aspects of the
programs (types of donors and recipients, types of services, geographic
areas covered).
These observations are somewhat paradoxical. On aspects that
should be most sensitive to local conditions, the programs are remarka-
bly similar."1 What might have been an unavoidable necessity had this
been a federal program requiring nationally uniform thresholds, defini-
tions, and fees, is paradoxically adopted in a series of programs created
and controlled on the local level.
On the other hand, there is greater variation on the more substantive
program elements, such as determining who should bear the cost, who
should benefit, what types of services should be supported, and
whether a linkage fee is justifiable or desirable. Yet, some of these
questions should be the subject of long-range policymaking at the state
or national level. It is questionable whether these important issues in-
volving social services should be left wholly to short-range statements
made by each locality.
E. Contextual Variables
The question whether linkage applies to a particular city depends on
local characteristics, or "contextual variables." The following discus-
sion indicates relevant variables.
* Market Strength of the Development Being Tapped: This involves
determining whether the city has some burgeoning types of develop-
ment that can serve as "donors." For example, is there a strong down-
town that is likely to remain strong? San Francisco and Boston had
51. These aspects include: the amount of actual need for housing generated by the
new development; housing costs and market demands; strength of the commercial mar-
ket; actual income levels and particular social needs in the community.
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strong pressures for downtown development when their programs were
instituted. Development in Manhattan is very strong and thus would
present New York City as a good candidate for linkage. But down-
town development strength may be ephemeral. Even in New York
there have been recent reports of some weakening in demand for office
space.
Other cities and towns might have other suitable candidates for
linkage, including suburban shopping centers, industries, or exurban
offices. The "reverse linkage" proposed for Madison illustrates candi-
dates other than downtown areas.
* Policy Regarding Candidate for Tapping: Even if they have a
booming industry of one kind or another, cities differ in whether they
seek to promote the boom. For example, San Francisco has adopted an
overt policy to try to discourage downtown development, and in 1986
placed a cap on development.52 New York City, on the other hand,
has a declared policy of promoting further economic development in
the downtown.53 Therefore, even though a viable candidate may exist,
linkage may be thwarted by the city's other interests.
Cities also consider the regional context in deciding whether to
adopt linkage. If neighboring cities lack a linkage policy, the city in
question will consider the regional disadvantage it may incur by intro-
ducing linkage. Fear of competition from suburbs or other major cities
may force a city to forego a linkage policy.
* Degree of Restriction on Local Taxing Powers: The two well-
known programs of San Francisco and Boston are in cities where vot-
ers have restricted the authority to impose new taxes. Linkage, as an
attempt to impose a fee through regulation rather than taxation, was
therefore an attractive alternative for these two cities. Some other
states and cities lack such restrictions.
* The Local Political Atmosphere: Local politics is an important va-
riable in evaluating linkage. Although some of the political factors re-
lating to linkage policies are similar in different locales, significant
political differences on both the state and local levels may also exist.
These differences pertain to the relative political strength of the sup-
porters of low income housing and the developers.54 Although it is
52. See Keating, supra note 2; Porter, Update Sheets, supra note 10.
53. See supra note 27 (interview with Mr. Carl Weisbrod).
54. E. Deakin reports significant differences in political dynamics regarding linkage
and other forms of exactions. See generally Deakin, The Politics of Exactions, in R.
Alterman, supra note 1, at 96. See generally Susskind and McMahon, supra note 17.
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likely that state and local authorities will find the linkage issue on their
political agenda in the near future, political outcomes are unpredict-
able. For example, even in Chicago, where the late Mayor Washing-
ton's promise to introduce a linkage policy created a coalition on this
issue among otherwise opposing groups, adoption of such a policy has
proven to be difficult.5"
III. EVALUATION OF LINKAGE POLICIES
Existing linkage policies supply enough evidence for a preliminary
evaluation. The evaluation presented here is to outline in advance the
implications of linkage in general and alternative forms in particular.
A set of evaluation criteria is first proposed, and each criterion is then
applied in subsequent sections.
A. Criteria for Evaluation
* Legality: Linkage is a new type of policy, imposed on the land use
control system. In this author's opinion, however, it is not simply a
linear extension of established types of land use controls. What could
be its legal basis? What are its chances of withstanding legal chal-
lenges? Can some types of linkage be more resilient than others to
legal attack?
* Sensitivity to Market Effects: How sensitive are linkage policies to
changes in the development market? What market effect might linkage
have?
* Effectiveness--Capacity to Deliver: What extent of funds/housing
units can be expected to be delivered by linkage? How have existing
programs performed? What are the relevant differences among the
programs?
* Targeting: How effectively can linkage target the housing pro-
duced to lower income groups? Are there significant differences among
particular versions of linkage?
* Social and Political Implications of the Mechanism for Trust Fund
Allocation: How will the decisions be made regarding the allocation of
trust fund money? What are the political and social implications?
Which target groups are likely to benefit most?
* Social Implications of Housing Location: What will be the geo-
graphic results of lower income housing location, both under the trust
55. Interview with Mr. Charles Thurow of the Department of City Planning, Chi-
cago City Hall, October 14, 1986, and subsequent telephone updates in February 1987.
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fund option and under the actual construction option? What are the
social implications of the resulting pattern?
* Public Justification and Equity: Linkage implies a new relation-
ship between the public and private sectors in land development. On
what public policy grounds can it be justified? What are its implica-
tions for equity?
B. Legality:
The courts have yet to directly test the legality of linkage. A few
cases have considered linkage on nonsubstantive grounds, such as a
case on Boston's linkage ordinance. 6 This section will examine the
potential arguments regarding the legality of linkage and their chances
of success. This evaluation is from the perspective of an observer of
American land use law with a comparative viewpoint.
Since linkage is a new type of policy, legal commentators and city
attorneys advising local governments have sought conceptual analogies
with existing types of policies which have an established body of law.
Two main approaches have been followed, both seeking to classify
linkage as a police power mechanism. They parallel the two types of
policy roots for linkage discussed in Section I.B.: inclusionary zoning
and exactions, especially impact fees. The latter avenue is increasingly
dominant, but the first deserves some analysis as well.
1. Linkage and Inclusionary Zoning
Some legal scholars view linkage as inclusionary zoning located
downtown rather than in the subt-bb where the "classic" inclusionary
zoning is applied.57 New Jersey and California have already recog-
nized the legality of mandatory or optional inclusionary zoning ordi-
56. Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986), challenged the
provisions of the Boston Zoning Code that established linkage. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court did not decide on the merits of the claim, finding that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to challenge the linkage program. This decision set aside the ruling
of the lower court that the linkage legislation exceeded the city's zoning powers and was
therefore invalid. Information on this case was provided by Mr. Donald L. Connors of
Choate, Hall and Stewart in Boston. See also Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 7.
Another case with kinship to linkage is San Telmo Associates v. City of Seattle, 735
P.2d 673 (Wash. 1987). There, the Washington State Supreme Court found the city's
housing preservation ordinance to be an invalid tax rather than a legitimate exercise of
the police power. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 7.
57. See generally INCLUSIONARY ZONING, supra note 8.
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nances.58 If the inclusionary zoning analogy were to hold, linkage
would suffer few legal setbacks in these states. Although some leading
legal scholars initially saw linkage as a form of inclusionary zoning,
59
others recognize that the analogy is tenuous.60
Inclusionary zoning, as a reaction to exclusionary zoning practices,
is a policy designed to create zoning districts and neighborhoods that
have a mixture of housing types and income groups. 61 This rationale
clearly applies to programs that require a set-aside of housing on-site.
When the program is aimed at an in-lieu fee or the off-site supply of
housing,62 it may fail to provide mixed neighborhoods because the lo-
cational link is relaxed. Although inclusionary zoning programs are
becoming more akin to exactions and linkage,63 fundamental differ-
ences in legal and public policy rationales between the two types of
policies still exist.
Inclusionary zoning is a type of "district zoning" that reflects a sub-
stantive planning policy about the desirable content of housing devel-
opments. This policy regarding the desired socioeconomic mix is
similar to many planning statements embodied in zoning districts, re-
lating to the desired mix of land uses, densities and the allocation of
adequate land for roads and parking. As the late Paul Davidoff has
argued eloquently, the fact that inclusionary zoning deals with a social
goal should not affect the criteria used for testing its legality."4
Unlike inclusionary zoning, the typical linkage policy is usually ob-
livious to the desirable character of the zone near the office buildings
paying the fee and to the quality of the recipient neighborhoods. In-
stead, linkage deals with the quantitative production of housing and
the allocation of responsibility for financing it. On the other hand, in-
58. See A. MALLACH, supra note 7, at 28-37; D. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAW
214-220 (1982).
59. See, eg., Mandelker, The Constitutionality of Inclusionary Zoning, in INCLUSIO-
NARY ZONING, supra note 8, at 31. See also Bosselman and Stroud, Mandatory Tithes:
The Legality of Land Development Linkage, 17 LAND USE AND ENVTL. L. REV. 151,
159 (1986).
60. See Bosselman, Panel Comments, in INCLUSIONARY ZONING, supra note 8, at
41-43; Bellman, Panel Comments, in INCLUSIONARY ZONING, supra note 8, at 43-46.
61. See A. MALLACH, supra note 7, at 11-13.
62. See supra note 36 (New York City's Inclusionary Housing program).
63. This point is also made by Bosselman and Stroud, supra note 59, at 159.
64. See Davidoff, Zoning As a Class Act, in INCLUSIONARY ZONING, supra note 8,
at 1. See also Mandelker, The Constitutionality of Inclusionary Zoning in INCLUSION-
ARY ZONING, supra note 8, at 31.
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clusionary zoning is concerned with the qualitative aspect of affordable
housing.
Another difference between the two programs is that inclusionary
zoning is a remedial measure for faulty public and private planning
policies.65 In other words, if developers, local authorities, and other
government or public bodies had supplied mixed housing areas at their
own initiative, there would be less of a need for inclusionary zoning
and less motivation for compulsory state-level policies made famous by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Mount Laurel 11 case.6 6 Linkage
is not a remedial measure for faulty planning. Far from asking devel-
opers to ensure a better social mixture, linkage imposes on developers
the onus of supplying or financing housing affordable to low and mid-
dle income families.
The public and legal rationale for inclusionary zoning thus differs
from linkage on some basic points. For these reasons, the inclusionary
zoning analogy to linkage is no longer dominant.
2. Linkage and Exactions Tests
The scope and application of exactions have increased considerably
in recent years, as described in Section I.B. Both traditional and newer
forms of exactions such as impact fees have gained legal acceptance. 67
Exactions have benefited from significant illumination by the courts
and by numerous scholarly articles.68 This judicial acceptance of exac-
tions has led commentators and municipal advisors to attempt to place
linkage under the well-recognized regulatory roof of exactions. Com-
mentators disagree as to whether the tests developed for exactions ap-
ply to linkage.69
65. See Bellman, supra note 60.
66. Southern Burlington County, NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,
456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). See Bellman, supra note 60, at 44.
67. This point is made by most of the commentators on exactions law cited in this
paper. For a detailed survey of court decisions, see Calies, The Impact Fee! Funding
Public Facilities Generated by New Land Development, paper prepared for the American
Institute of Certified Planners Workshop, Land Use Law for Planners and Lawyers,
March 12, 1987, Honolulu, Hawaii.
68. A law journal that has recently devoted a special issue to the subject lists some
180 legal articles and commentary notes devoted to the subject since 1949. See 50 LAw
& CONTEMP. PRODS. 1 (1987). Recently, several full-length books have appeared de-
voted entirely to exactions. For an analysis of this trend, See R. Alterman, supra note 1,
at 12-13.
69. See generally Diamond, supra note 14; Connors and Meacham, Paying the
Piper: What Can Local Government Require as a Condition of Development Approval?
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Although the impact of the two recent United States Supreme Court
land use decisions7" on the tests for exactions is unclear, most commen-
tators do not predict a change in the tests. It is, however, reasonable to
assume that the rules of the game and the stakes involved may have
changed. As a result of First English, municipalities will probably be
more cautious in implementing programs that might constitute a tak-
ing of property because courts might now invalidate the ordinance and
require payment of compensation for the period during which the tak-
ing was effective. Furthermore, Nollan implies that courts will apply
greater rigor in their scrutiny of exactions.71 The following are the
accepted tests for judging the legality of exactions.
a. Tax or Regulation?
This test examines whether the exaction is a land use regulation or a
disguised tax. This test applies especially to exactions that involve a
financial payment, such as fees in lieu of supplying infrastructure and
impact fees. Since all linkage programs have a fee component, this
question is especially relevant.
Determining whether an exaction is a regulation or a tax has far-
reaching implications. If classified as a tax, the exaction is invalid un-
less it is expressly and specifically authorized by statute. On the other
hand, if the exaction is viewed as an exercise of police power, it will be
upheld under a broader legislative delegation of power.72 The authori-
zation required when the exaction is classified as a regulation depends
16TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMI-
NENT DOMAIN, Ch. 2; Bosselman and Stroud, supra note 59; Smith, supra note 4; Ju-
ergensmeyer, supra note 2; Marcus, supra note 29.
70. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987).
71. Merriam, Commentary, 12 NEWSLETTER OF THE PLANNING AND LAW Divi-
SION, AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION (1987); Bosselman and Stroud, The Current
Status of Development Exactions, 14 FLA. ENVTL. AND URB. IssuES 8 (1987); Lee and
Gluckman, Hysteria Aside, the First Lutheran Church Case Is Not That Bad for Florida,
14 FLA. ENVTL. AND URB. IssuEs 6 (1987); Taub, The Current Status of the Taking
Issue, 14 FLA. E TiL. AND URB. IssuEs 10 (1987). Others agree, but place greater
substantive import on the demand for closer scrutiny. Compare Bauman, The Meaning
of the Supreme Court's First Lutheran Church and Nollan Decisions, 14 FLA. ENVTL.
AND URB. Issuns 5 (1987); and Marcus, supra note 29. See infra note 77 and accompa-
nying text.
72. D. HAGMAN AND J.C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOP-
MENT CONTROL LAW 208-09 (1986) [hereinafter D. HAGMAN AND J.C. JUERGEN-
SMEYER]. Juergensmeyer notes that classification by the court as a regulation or a tax is
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on the degree of specificity of the state enabling legislation, the exist-
ence of home rule powers, and the attitude of the courts.73
Since it is difficult to authorize exactions as a tax, local authorities
usually attempt to ensure that their linkage program is classified as a
land use regulation. Indeed, most of the linkage programs surveyed for
this paper were incorporated into zoning legislation. While recent
court decisions regarding impact fees have generally favored their clas-
sification as regulations, linkage fees may not fare as well.74
The fundamental distinction between taxes and fees is that fees are
used to regulate land use while taxes are employed to raise revenue. It
is clear that office-to-housing linkage is directed toward raising reve-
nue. Without impact fees, however, it would be impossible to supply
the necessary public services and the quality of the residential environ-
ment would decline. It is thus legitimate under general police power
purposes for local government to condition zoning relief or a building
permit on payment of a fee.75 Therefore, impact fees are classified as a
regulation and not a tax.
In the case of linkage, the quality of office development would not
suffer if low income housing is not built. As a result, it is difficult to
justify conditioning commercial development on the payment of a
linkage fee as a land use regulation. Perhaps the tax avenue should not
be ruled out altogether. In the absence of voter-initiated restrictions on
the authority to tax, it might be worthwhile to consider whether a
linkage fee can be structured as a valid tax.
b. Rational Nexus
The rational nexus test inquires into the existence of a reasonable
often done in a result-oriented manner. In other words, if the court intends to invali-
date the exaction, it will classify it as a tax. Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 55.
73. See Connors and Meacham, supra note 69, at 2-18.
In New York State, for example, both a liberal and a strict view can be found in court
decisions, but a recent case has taken the strict view that explicit authority is required
for acquiring powers for land use regulation. See Kamhi v. Planning Bd. of the Town of
Yorktown, 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983).
74. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 57-59, 61-63.
75. In a Florida Supreme Court decision the court presents the following argument
why impact fees are not taxes: "The municipality seeks to shift to the user expenses
incurred on his account. A private utility in the same circumstances would presumably
do the same thing, in which event surely even petitioners would not suggest that the
private corporation was attempting to levy a tax on its customers." Contractors and
Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 318 (Fla.
1976).
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connection between the need created by the new development and the
exaction. This test has emerged in recent years as the dominant test for
the validity of exactions. Courts have developed this test and the two
that follow especially for exactions, as a substitute for the usual consti-
tutional tests applied to other government actions.76 This point is rein-
forced by the Nollan case. There, the Supreme Court noted that the
condition placed on a building permit must substantially advance legit-
imate state interests. This standard is more stringent than the rational
relationship standard applied to due process or equal protection
claims.77
In the past decade or two, the courts have relaxed the reasonable
connection necessary to uphold an exaction as compared with earlier
tests whose roots were in the more traditional versions of exactions.
The earlier, more stringent "specifically and uniquely attributable" test
was enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1961 and is still in
effect in Illinois.78 That test requires municipalities to prove that the
need for the additional facilities to be provided or financed through
exactions is attributable to the new development alone. This test is, of
course, difficult to satisfy regarding most off-site public facilities.
Fortunately, a more relaxed test has since been applied to exactions,
first spelled out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1966 in Jordan v.
Village of Menomonee Falls.7 9 An exaction is upheld if a reasonable
connection can be shown between the need for the additional facilities
and the growth generated by the new development. This reasonable
connection can also be demonstrated when the new development has
contributed to a general increase in demand. 80
The commentators disagree as to how the reasonable connection test
76. D. MANDELKER AND R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 513 (1985); Bosselman and Str6ud, supra
note 59, at 167.
77. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1987).
78. Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375,
176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); cited in Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 64 n.9. For an analysis
of the implications of the test for linkage in Illinois, see Meyer, Chicago's Linked Devel-
opment Fund The Legality of Imposing an Exaction Fee on Large-Scale Downtown
Office Developments, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 205 (1987).
79. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
80. IdL See also Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure: Paying the Costs of Growth
Through Impact Fees and Other Land Regulation Charges, in THE CHANGING STRUC-
TURE OF INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE 23, 29 (J.C. Nicholas ed. 1985).
The New York Appellate Division clearly rejected the more stringent tests and ruled
that a relationship is demonstrated "provided that the proposed development is a con-
[Vol. 34:3
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will affect linkage. Thode who feel that linkage is essentially a type of
exaction usually assume that a causal link between new office space and
an increased demand for lower income housing exists. For this group,
the only difficulty lies in finding sophisticated research methodology to
prove and quantify the relationship between office space and housing.81
These analysts therefore rely on improved planning and research ca-
pacity to withstand legal challenges.8"
Other commentators are somewhat more skeptical about whether
the linkage relationship is sufficient to survive the rational nexus test. 3
Today, their skepticism is enhanced by the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions in Nollan and First English. This author believes that the rela-
tionship between office or commercial development and low income
housing is substantively different from the relationship found in "regu-
lar" exactions.
In the typical infrastructure and amenity exaction, the relationship
between the new development and the need for which the exaction is
taken is one of dependency. The service exacted is ancillary to the ma-
jor land use and is necessary for the operation of the new development
within existing standards of public services and environmental quality.
For example, roads, schools and parks are ancillary to a residential
development. Without this infrastructure, the quality of the main land
tributing factor to the problem sought to be alleviated." Holmes v. Town of New Cas-
tle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); cited by Tegeler, supra note 26, at 691.
81. See Merriam and Andrews, supra note 2; Bosselman and Stroud, supra note 59.
For an example of applied demonstration of research as the basis of Boston's linkage
assumptions, see Kayden and Pollard, supra note 2.
82. This conclusion is enunciated most clearly by Merriam and Andrews, supra
note 2, at 205.
83. See Marcus, supra note 29. Marcus is skeptical about many aspects of linkage.
Juergensmeyer states that "linkage programs would seem to be the most susceptible of
all exactions to a taking challenge since the link between the development and the bene-
fit of the fees paid are at times less direct." Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 66. Meyer
states that "the need for additional housing is not specifically and uniquely attributable
to large-scale downtown office developments because these developments, while gener-
ating jobs, are not placing additional pressure on the housing market. The service sec-
tor employment growth is offset by the loss of manufacturing jobs and the pool of
unemployed workers." Meyer, supra note 78, at 212. Although Meyer refers to tL
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test, his conclusion about the weak link would
lead to a negative conclusion under the rational nexus test as well. Id. Bosselman and
Stroud, although finally coming down on the cautiously optimistic side, first take the
reader through a series of convincing arguments that cast doubt about whether one can
show adequate directness of the link. Bosselman and Stroud, supra note 59. Callies also
expresses some skepticism. Callies, supra note 67, at 40.
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use would be diminished. Usually, a reversal of roles is intrinsically
illogical. Residential construction would not be exacted of builders of
a shopping mall in order to supply them with customers. Thus, the
relationship of dependency easily supplies the necessary causal link for
proving a rational nexus.
In contrast, the relationship between new office or commercial devel-
opment and lower income housing is not one of dependency but rather
of direct or indirect correlation between the two land uses. The corre-
lation may or may not reflect an underlying causal relationship.
A causal relationship clearly exists where the office development di-
rectly reduces the number of existing housing units, but this is not the
typical case of linkage. In other cases, a statistically significant correla-
tion may reflect various intervening variables related to the typical re-
gional housing and employment markets. These other variables might
be the underlying causes for the increased demand for lower income
housing.
In fact, some degree of statistical correlation could be shown be-
tween many land uses and activities within urban areas. After all, ur-
ban centers are by definition agglomerations of interdependencies. The
office development/housing relationship may not be stronger than
many others. Indeed, where only a correlation can be proven, a re-
versed causal relationship could just as easily be argued-for example,
that new housing causes the need for more places of employment
rather than the reverse. As Claud Gruen has stated in a piquant and
oft-quoted phrase, "[A]dditions to the supply of office space do not
create office employment any more than cribs make babies."84 That
argument could not be made in the case of infrastructure exactions.
Therefore, courts might view a relationship or correlation as insuffi-
cient for satisfying the rational nexus test.
Granted, one can find occasional examples of court decisions that
accept an infrastructure exaction as legal even though the dependency
relationship and the causal link is remote. However, these cases are by
no means representative of the typical practice of infrastructure exac-
tions. Instead, they border the outer limits of the rational nexus.
Although courts may defer to the local authority's judgment in border-
line cases of infrastructure exactions, courts will likely be reluctant to
84. Gruen, The Economics of Requiring Office-Space Development to Contribute to
the Production and/or Rehabilitation of Housing, in D. PoRTER, supra note 2, at 36.
See also Netzer, Exactions in the Private Finance Context, in R. Alterman, supra note 1,
at 46.
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do so in linkage, where even mainstream cases are on the outer fringes
of the nexus relationship.
Most commentators agree that after the Nollan decision courts are
likely to scrutinize arguments about rational nexus more closely than
in the past."5 The Nollan test will make the tenuous argument about
the causal link even more difficult to assert.8 6 A statement made by
Bosselman and Stroud is worth noting: "[Miore rigorous scrutiny of
the rational relationship test may make it difficult to justify exactions
designed to resolve broad public problems for which the specific devel-
opment proposal of the particular developer bears no real blame in a
cost accounting sense."8"
c. Proportionality
Another test is whether the burden imposed on the new development
is proportional to the need that it creates. The proportionality test de-
rives from the equal protection guarantee of the U.S. Constitution.
Linkage is likely to survive an equal protection challenge based on the
fact that a particular class of developers is singled out for special treat-
ment. Developers are not a "suspect class," and the right to develop
property is not a fundamental right.88 Therefore, linkage does not trig-
ger the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection.
The proportionality test for exactions as drawn by Utah and Florida
is more demanding than equal protection. This test inquires into the
treatment of the class singled out and the treatment of the members of
that class. In the 1981 decision of Banberry Development Corporation
v. South Jordan City,89 the Utah Supreme Court developed a sophisti-
cated test requiring that new developers pay only their share "in com-
parison with the other properties in the municipality as a whole; the fee
in question should not exceed the amount sufficient to equalize the rel-
ative burden of newly developed and other properties."'  The court
85. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
86. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1987).
87. Bosselman and Stroud, supra note 59, at 166. This statement was written two
years before the Supreme Court decision in Nollan. Despite this statement, Bosselman
and Stroud are cautiously optimistic about the chances for linkage to survive legal scru-
tiny as an exaction.
88. See Merriam and Andrews, supra note 2, at 18; Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at
59-60.
89. 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981); cited in D. HAGMAN AND J.C. JUERdENSMEYER,
supra note 72, at 212.
90. 631 P.2d at 903.
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listed guidelines for ensuring the proportionality of the burden. These
guidelines included: the manner in which existing facilities have been
financed; the relative extent to which the new developments and ex-
isting ones have already contributed to the cost of existing facilities
through payment of the property tax and special assessments; the fu-
ture contributions expected; and whether the developed properties are
entitled to a credit.91 In other words, Banberry requires proportional-
ity at present and in the future, as well as the introduction of a sophisti-
cated system of credits.92
In Contractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of
Dunedin93 the Florida Supreme Court also required proportionality.
The Dunedin court required that the fees imposed on users must be no
more than what the local government would incur in accommodating
the new users of the system.
How will linkage fare if tested according to the proportionality prin-
ciples of Banberry and Dunedin? Allowing credit to the new developer
for past and future payments is not a problem because it is based on an
accounting of the payments made by the donor alone, rather than in
relation to nonpayers.9 4 Since lower income housing generally has not
been financed by local taxes or fees, any past payments are indirect and
likely to be small. Suitable arrangements should be made for crediting
future property tax or other payments toward any future housing
programs.
More difficult to overcome is the problem of proportionality among
past and present developers. In considering this problem, a distinction
should be made between proportionality among new developers at
present (horizontal proportionality) and proportionality between past
and present developers (longitudinal proportionality). Longitudinal
proportionality does not fare well under most linkage programs. Since
municipalities generally have not supplied housing for lower and mid-
dle income households in the past, it is unlikely that existing down-
town-type developments have ever been asked to pay for it. Today,
91. Id ; cited in D. HAGMAN AND J.C. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 72, at 212.
92. See also D. MANDELKER AND R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 76, at 531.
93. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
94. Some commentators argue that allowing credits is not a problem because the
fees charged, at least in Boston and San Francisco, are well below the estimated addi-
tional cost generated by the new development. See Kayden and Pollard, supra note 2, at
136-37; Bosselman and Stroud, supra note 59, at 180-81. This, however, is not part of
the problem of proportionality but of the rational nexus-that one be charged for the
need created. Proportionality pertains to relations among developers.
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however, these existing developments escape the burden of providing
housing which is imposed on new developments. Thus, the problem of
longitudinal proportionality is considerably more acute in the case of
linkage than in infrastructure exactions. Through exactions, existing
development has usually provided for roads, parks, and schools. In
fact, the rationale for exactions is often that existing residents do not
wish to finance the facilities needed by new residents.
Horizontal proportionality may fare somewhat better. Under most
exaction schemes, not all classes of developers have been required to
dedicate land or to pay impact fees. Similarly, linkage programs often
require payment only from selected classes of housing-generating de-
velopments and conversions. However, linkage ensures less horizontal
proportionality than exactions because it has more exemptions than the
usual exaction programs, including thresholds and exemptions for con-
versions or rehabilitations. Yet, if the linkage program minimizes or
justifies these disparities, it may survive the courts' scrutiny of horizon-
tal proportionality.
Municipalities considering linkage can either hope to avoid a
Banberry test, or they can attempt to formulate their linkage policy so
as to increase both horizontal and longitudinal proportionality. To im-
prove longitudinal proportionality, municipalities can propose a fee or
tax to apply to existing floor space of the type of development being
charged the linkage fee. This would enhance proportionality between
past and present developers. For example, a user tax on office and
commercial space was considered by the Chicago Advisory Committee
on Linked Development." Horizontal proportionality could be im-
proved by the following measures: imposing the linkage fee on conver-
sions and rehabilitations as well as new construction; selecting the
donor development classes rationally; and rationally justifying thresh-
old levels instead of arbitrarily selecting the levels.
d. Reasonable Benefit
The final test inquires into who will benefit from the exaction. If the
total community benefits without a specific benefit to the donor devel-
opment, the exaction is likely to be classified as a tax.9 6 Under an exac-
tion program, the new development should receive some reasonable
degree of benefit. This test has also been considerably relaxed in recent
95. See Appendix, Chicago.
96. Connors and Meacham, supra note 69, at 17.
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years. In contrast to the earlier tests that require proof of direct bene-
fit, the benefit to the development need not be exclusive or direct, but it
should be more specific than a general community benefit.
This second type of rational relationship test was implied by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's Menomonee Falls9 7 decision. Although
the court did not define "reasonableness" of benefit, some commenta-
tors suggest that the court implied that "if a local government can
demonstrate that its actual or projected extradevelopment capital ex-
penditures earmarked for the substantial benefit of a series of develop-
ments are greater than the capital payments required of those
development," then sufficient benefit is demonstrated.98
As many commentators note, the benefit test also implies that
earmarking of the funds designated for the community's need is highly
advisable.99 Most linkage programs have a mechanism to designate
funds through a housing trust fund or some other way. If the test of
reasonable benefit is applied by the courts, however, earmarking funds
may be insufficient. Since local governments usually do not expend
their own funds on lower income housing, it would be difficult for them
to show that the designated expenditures for housing intended to bene-
fit the donor class of developments are greater than the payments made
through linkage.
Furthermore, in most cities it is difficult to demonstrate that a rea-
sonable degree of benefit from the new housing would accrue to the
donor. Designers of linkage programs argue that the additional hous-
ing will have a generally positive market effect on the availability of
affordable housing. Despite this optimism, however, the amount of
housing financed through linkage is small when compared with the
shortage of affordable housing, and the effect of the effort on housing
stock and prices will likely be insignificant."°° It is unclear whether the
courts will find this degree of benefit to be sufficient to uphold linkage
programs.
3. Is Housing a Public Facility?
Before concluding this survey of tests for legality, another question
97. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
98. D. HAGMAN AND J.C. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 72, at 211.
99. Connors and Meacham, supra note 69, at 18; Bosselman and Stroud, supra note
59, at 181; Callies, supra note 67, at 28-30.
100. See Susskind and McMahon, supra note 17, at 208-209.
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should be addressed which is rarely articulated in exactions cases.
What is the "public facility" or "public amenity" that is a legitimate
target for exactions? Most types of exactions recognized in previous
court decisions and implemented in practice, apply to infrastructure,
buildings, or amenities that are "public" in some way. These facilities
usually possess some of the attributes of a public good, which are non-
exclusiveness of use, ready access to the public needing that facility
and, sometimes, public ownership of the property.1 °1
Housing, on the other hand, does not possess any of the attributes of
a public good. Linkage-produced housing units could be purchased by
the residents to become their private property. Use of a housing unit
by one family is exclusive of other users. Most societies have public
goals about social redistribution of housing, but the redistribution of a
private good is a classic target for implementation through general tax-
ation, not exactions.
4. Will Mandatory Linkage Survive the Exactions Tests?
The ambit of the four tests for determining the legality of mandatory
exactions has been expanded with time. Linkage does not pass any of
the four tests with ease. Although a case can be made that linkage
could survive each test separately, the likelihood that it would survive
them all is slight. Since linkage is on the outer perimeter of legality on
these tests, it is unlikely that it will survive judicial scrutiny.
5. Possible Alternative Legal Bases for Linkage
There are alternative legal bases for mandatory linkage programs.
Although policymakers avoid characterizing linkage as a tax, linkage is
clearly more related to revenue raising than land regulation. To adopt
linkage as a tax, explicit state authority is necessary.
Alternatively, in some states, certain aspects of linkage might come
under existing laws and procedures of environmental quality review. A
recent decision by the New York State Court of Appeals has affirmed
that a developer must mitigate secondary displacement arising from
the construction of luxury condominiums in New York City's China-
101. For a definition of a public good in relation to the justification of exactions, see
Netzer, supra note 84, at 40-41. See also Bosselman and Stroud, supra note 59, at 175.
Bosselman and Stroud note that "[m]odern courts have suggested few limitations on the
range of public facilities and services for which exactions may be used." Id. (emphasis
added).
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town.1 "2 This decision is limited to situations where new development
causes displacement of existing housing, and would have little rele-
vance to a general demand for more housing.
The foregoing analysis is more applicable to mandatory and quasi-
mandatory linkage than to incentive-based or negotiated linkage. In-
centive-based linkage is more likely to withstand a legal challenge than
is mandatory linkage.1"3 Although negotiated linkage enjoys the rec-
ommendation of some commentators, 1°4 it is subject to challenge as
contract zoning or as a violation of equal protection because of non-
uniform administration. 5 In-depth discussion of these options is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, the concept of linkage could be cast into a different legal and
public policy mold which would better reflect its underlying rationale.
This option is discussed in the concluding section of this paper.
C. Sensitivity to Market Effects
It is important for linkage to be sensitive to market effects because it
is targeted specifically at economically burgeoning land uses. In the
linkage programs surveyed, the fee was set at between 2 and 6 percent
of the cost of developing the donor project. Porter estimates that Bos-
ton's linkage program will raise rental rates by only 1 or 2 percent,
while San Francisco's total fees will add perhaps 4 or 5 percent to con-
struction and leasing costs." 6
Although the burden in absolute terms is not high, the effect of the
fee in a competitive market should be evaluated. If the development
tapped is high growth and the developer's decision to locate in the par-
ticular area is not a marginal decision, the fee is unlikely to signifi-
cantly affect development. When alternative locations in the city or the
region present competition, however, the fee may become an important
factor in a firm's decision. If the linkage program drives developers
102. Chinese Staff and Workers Ass'n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 359, 502
N.E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. 1986). This case is cited and analyzed in Marcus,
supra note 29, at endnote 48.
103. This point is made by several authors. See, e-g., Merriam and Andrews, supra
note 2, at 5.
104. Susskind and McMahon, supra note 17.
105. Regarding linkage and the contract clause of the Constitution, see Merriam
and Andrews, supra note 2, at 19-21.
106. Porter, Pain Before Gain: Developer Views on Housing Linkage Programs, in
R. Alterman, supra note 1, at 153, 155.
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away, the loss in tax revenues may be much greater than the potential
revenues raised through linkage. For example, one large office building
in downtown Chicago could pay more in state and local taxes over a
twenty-year period than the total anticipated linkage contributions
from all projects for that same period.10 7
The problem is that the market for commercial development is sensi-
tive to a variety of local, regional, and national economic factors that
may be difficult to anticipate. This is especially true for development
that is part of the city's economic base. For example, a San Francisco
study by David Dowall indicates a marked trend toward relocating
backoffice employees out of the downtown area because of the high
rental prices. 0 8 In contrast, land uses that follow residential develop-
ment may be less sensitive to the market.
The linkage programs surveyed show different capacities to adjust to
changes in the market. Some programs have attempted to incorporate
a measure of flexibility. San Francisco's ordinance requires that an an-
nual evaluation report be made to the Board of Supervisors and a com-
pulsory review after five years. Boston requires the fee formula to be
recalculated every three years. Compulsory re-evaluation, if performed
at short intervals, is probably preferable to a sunset rule because the
latter may itself have an undesirable effect on the market.
The three major types of linkage programs have different effects on
the market. Planners of mandatory and quasi-mandatory programs
should be especially concerned with overrigidity and should seek
mechanisms for effective re-evaluations. A bonus-based fee is some-
what sensitive to market demand. If the fee is a deterrent, the bonus
would presumably not be sought. However, the as-of-right develop-
ment might not be lucrative either, in which case a dampening effect on
development would occur nevertheless. Therefore, incentive-based
linkage should also include mechanisms to monitor flexibility.
A negotiation-based program is least likely to affect development ad-
versely. Appropriate adjustments and tradeoffs can be accomplished
during negotiations to adapt to the rate of development. For example,
if necessary, the city can offer tradeoffs with exactions for infrastruc-
ture or amenities without abandoning the linkage policy. The amount
of the fee can be adjusted as well.
Finally, the threshold component of most mandatory linkage pro-
107. Id.
108. Dowall, Endangered Species" San Francisco's Back-Office Employees, 45 UR-
BAN LAND 9 (1986).
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grams may also have an effect on the market. It could be anticipated
that medium-sized projects would be likely to choose a size just below
the threshold. Preliminary evidence from Boston, however, fails to
support this fear because of the absence of projects of a size just below
the cutoff point.'0 9 Still, it is advisable to monitor and re-evaluate the
threshold levels along with the level of the fee.
D. Effectiveness-Capacity to Deliver
How effective is linkage likely to be in delivering low and moderate
income housing units? Can it significantly affect housing needs, and
will it be a reliable source of funding? A distinction should be made
between the fee option and the construction option. In Boston, despite
the existence of a construction option, the great majority of developers
elected to pay the fee. In the first three years of its operation, the Bos-
ton program reportedly produced a total of approximately $40 million
in payments and commitments. As of early 1987, these funds had yet
to produce any housing."o In contrast, in the San Francisco pro-
gram's first years, the construction option was the major avenue of im-
plementation."' After the ordinance was enacted in August 1986,
however, the fee option may have become more important.
There are two hypotheses regarding why the construction option
was preferred in San Francisco. The first hypothesis is that the con-
struction option allowed the developer an opportunity to substitute
some units which it would have built anyway, for units which the pro-
gram required it to add to the housing stock. As long as moderate
income units can be used to satisfy the program's construction option,
some degree of substitution is inevitable. Recall that in its first years,
the San Francisco program counted upper income housing units to-
ward fulfillment of the linkage requirement. The net units added be-
yond what the developer would have built anyway remains unknown.
The second hypothesis for explaining why the construction option
109. Informal interview with Ms. Edith Netter, then Special Counsel to the BRA,
Oct. 2, 1986. See supra note 22.
110. Id.
111. Keating, supra note 2, at 135. In reporting on what the San Francisco pro-
gram has delivered, Keating talks in terms of housing units constructed by developers
or through agreements with not-for-profit groups. No rigorous study has yet been car-
ried out on what was actually delivered, and one planned in 1987 could not be carried
out due to unavailability of reliable data (conversation with David Dowall who pro-
posed the study, April 1987). No further assessment can be provided by this author on
the actual division between units constructed and fees paid.
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might be preferred is that the San Francisco program failed to ade-
quately distinguish between rehabilitated and new units.
112
The preliminary evidence from Boston and San Francisco thus sup-
ports the assumption that unless the construction option contains sig-
nificant opportunities for savings, developers will choose the payment
option. This tendency is probably stronger in linkage than in
inclusionary zoning because linkage usually applies to commercial de-
velopers unaccustomed to constructing housing. When linkage re-
quirements are met through construction, the net number of units
actually added to the housing stock will probably be smaller than
reported.
Another concern about the effectiveness of linkage is its capacity to
ensure a steady source of income to sustain the program. Downtown-
type markets are sensitive to economic vicissitudes. The program can
weather short term slumps if the earmarked funds are used judiciously.
Many commentators have noted that the funds collected are small
compared with the amounts necessary to fulfill housing needs. Yet,
when compared with the size of currently available alternative sources
of public support for housing, the sums are impressive. The number of
units which will actually be constructed by linkage revenues depends
on the city's methods and the degree of leverage attained.
E. Targeting
Despite the declared purpose of most linkage programs to ameliorate
the housing needs of low and moderate income persons, the programs
usually lack a mechanism to ensure that low income households re-
ceive the intended benefit. Most linkage programs leave the problem of
allocation to the trust funds. Under the construction option, in the
absence of a mechanism that grants higher credit points to the devel-
oper for producing low income units or that requires the construction
of a percentage share of such units, it is unlikely that developers would
construct such units of their own free will.
It is difficult to explain the gap between the declared intentions and
the actual policy. It could be that those who designed the programs
felt that the problem of supplying low income housing through linkage
is intractable, whether for economic or political reasons. Yet as long as
a stated legislative goal is to produce housing for low income groups, a
bona fide attempt should be made to design the appropriate mechanism
112. Conversation with David Dowal, February 1987.
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for meeting that goal. Finding ways to target low income households
should not pose greater difficulty than establishing the linkage program
in the first place.
F. Trust Fund Allocations: Social and Political Implications
The record so far indicates that linkage programs will likely operate
largely through the option of the payment of fees deposited in an
earmarked fund. Despite the existence of several programs for the past
few years, officials have been slow to establish the trust funds. For
example, in Boston the legislation for setting up a trust fund was ap-
proved only in 1986. Criteria for allocation and decision had yet to be
formulated at that time.1 13
As long as the funds in a housing trust fund can meet only a very
small part of the need for affordable housing, one does not have to be
an expert in Realpolitik to anticipate the dynamics that are likely to
surround the allocation process. Some of the dynamics may be visible
already in Chicago, where a trust fund was considered. There, linkage
was proposed as part of the late Mayor Washington's election plat-
form. At that time, an interesting coalition of neighborhood housing
activists supported linkage. This "unholy alliance" consisted of two
groups which had long shown mutual acrimony-an ethnic white
working-class neighborhood that did not support Mayor Washington,
and a black neighborhood that did. 4 One cannot avoid wondering
how long this alliance would hold when the time comes for criteria to
be set up for apportioning the funds. Chester Hartman has noted that
the linkage issue sustains the neighborhood groups so long as it is an
agenda item for rallying public support, but may later weaken these
groups by making them adversaries when funds are allocated.115
Who is likely to benefit most from trust fund allocations? This is the
element of the targeting question that was elegantly avoided when the
linkage program was established. It is unclear whether the political
arena will be attuned to the needs of low income families in addressing
this question. In addition, the objectives of the trust fund are likely to
stress the possibilities of increasing the leverage of its funds in order to
produce the maximal number of units. Financing lower income units
113. Conversation with E. Netter, Special Counsel to the BRA, January 1987.
114. Interview with Mr. Charles Thurow, Deputy Commissioner of Planning, Chi-
cago, October 1986, and update conversation February 1987.
115. Informal interview with Mr. Chester Hartman of the Institute for Policy Stud-
ies, Washington, D.C., October 1986.
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that require deeper subsidies may thus be viewed as a burden. There-
fore, linkage funds will probably be targeted more to middle and mod-
erate income households than to lower ones. The political leverage of
the eligible groups, especially the lower income ones, will be important
in the allocation process.
G. Social Implications of Housing Location
Unlike inclusionary zoning, which was based on a social conception
of the desirable mixture of social and income groups within a commu-
nity, linkage is usually devoid of any sociogeographic goal. What are
likely to be the social implications of linkage-produced housing?
Under the construction option, it is unlikely that developers would in-
clude linked housing on the same site as market rate housing. The
units built to fulfill linkage requirements would usually be located on
less desirable sites, and little integration would ensue, especially where
units for low income families are concerned. Under the fee option,
locational decisions will depend on the criteria adopted by the trust
fund. A special effort is necessary to overcome segregationist tenden-
cies. One does not need a crystal ball to predict that social evaluation
studies in the future will criticize the social impacts of linked housing
and its economic effects on the budgets of lower income families. A
feeling of deja vu? Hopefully, scenarios from past public housing and
urban renewal programs will not be repeated.
This is perhaps an overly pessimistic picture. In reality, some of the
detrimental social effects of linkage can be avoided by structuring the
programs so as to designate the areas where the housing should be lo-
cated. This structure was employed in the Miami program. The new
concept of parcel-to-parcel linkage promises further improved thinking
about the social ramifications of linkage. Finally, the negative effects
could be reduced by encouraging participation between neighborhood
groups and developers.
H. An Alternative Rationale: Windfall Recapture
The legal analysis has shown that the exactions analogy for linkage
is tenuous and fails to supply the public justification necessary for
linkage. This does not, however, mean that linkage is an unjustifiable
public policy. The very fact that linkage is increasingly being discussed
and studied indicates its importance. However, it is this author's view
that the appeal of linkage stems not from the officially stated justifica-
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tion based on the exactions rationale, but from another rationale to be
found below the surface.
Linkage is actually grounded less on harm mitigation and more on
the concept of "windfall recapture." Known internationally as the re-
capture of betterment, the concept "windfall recapture" refers to the
unearned increment that accrues to developers not through their own
efforts, but through public decisions to upgrade the development value
of particular plots of land. The argument is that the public has a right
to share in the developer's unearned profit. Although this rationale has
yet to emerge on the American political and land policy agenda, the
late Donald Hagman has shown in his seminal work that various
mechanisms grounded in this concept already exist in the United
States. 116
Linkage shows that when a severe public need exists and alternative
financing mechanisms are no longer available, public opinion in the
United States may view a modest windfall-recapture policy as accepta-
ble. The windfall-recapture rationale is most clearly visible in incen-
tive-based and negotiated linkage policies. These policies require
payment of the fee or construction of lower income housing only if the
developer has also obtained a bonus. The bonus is in effect an incre-
ment in the value of the development, created not by the developer, but
by an offer made by the planning authorities. If the developer pays the
fee or constructs housing, the public shares in the developer's unearned
increment.
If the basic concepts underlying linkage are desirable, it may be
worthwhile to recast it overtly as a windfall-recapture technique. The
proper rationale could provide linkage with a more solid legal basis
than the current attempts to base linkage on the exactions analogy.
The difficult questions of equity and justice that linkage-as-exactions
raises would be resolved by the substitution of the windfall-recapture
rationale. This rationale will avoid the proportionality question of
whether developers alone should pay for a general community interest.
It becomes apparent that linkage programs select commercial develop-
ments as donors, not because they cause the need for housing, but be-
cause they are a high windfall land use. The rational nexus test is
therefore unnecessary. The benefit test becomes refrained because the
problem is no longer to ensure that the developer benefits, but to enable
116. D. HAGMAN, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEouTs: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND
COMPENSATION (1978). See also D. HAGMAN AND J.C. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note
72, at Ch. 11.
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the public to benefit from the unearned increment and to direct that
benefit to priority needs. Thus, the exactions tests of rational nexus,
proportionality, and benefit are recast in a manner suited to the de
facto character of linkage.
Additional advantages of a policy based on windfall recapture are its
sensitivity to changes in the real estate market, greater flexibility for
changing the target of the funds as circumstances change, and en-
hanced equity. A developer would not be required to pay a windfall-
recapture fee unless there has in fact been a significant increment in
land values due to public actions. Therefore, the danger of tapping a
shrinking market is much less acute with value capture. A windfall-
tapping program is potentially more flexible than linkage because the
funds are not designated only for rational nexus use: the designation
can be altered as needs change.
Finally, equity is increased because the tax base can be expanded to
include all developers who have gained a windfall of some predefined
level. It is unnecessary to single out a particular class of developers on
the basis of an assumed windfall. Only geese with real golden eggs will
be expected to share their profits with the public-and the emergence
of linkage shows that many are ready to do so today.
IV. CONCLUSION: EVALUATING LINKAGE, AND BEYOND
American cities are faced with undisputed evidence that the housing
market can no longer meet the expanding needs of low and moderate
income families. Washington has been unresponsive to these needs.
As a solution to this growing problem, linkage was first modestly pro-
posed in a few areas but is now generating interest across the country.
The evaluation of linkage presents a mixed picture. The major
strength of linkage is its capacity to deliver funds in significant
amounts at a time when few other resources are available. On the
other hand, linkage is far from the ideal policy for meeting housing
production needs, even at a time of difficult constraints. Linkage is
inherently temporary. By targeting a relatively narrow range of poten-
tial donors who are currently in a high profit category, linkage is vul-
nerable to market effects, especially through regional competition. As
presently structured, linkage is insufficiently tailored to meet the needs
of low income groups, as contrasted with moderate income ones. In
addition, linkage is often devoid of any social policy about the desirable
location and mix of housing. Finally, linkage usually lacks a sound
legal basis and convincing public policy rationale.
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Despite these shortcomings, linkage is increasingly popular with lo-
cal governments. In seeking local control and independence, local gov-
ernments characterize linkage as a type of exaction analogous to the
requirements imposed on developers to finance the public services
needed by new development. This analogy, however, is inaccurate. As
a result of this somewhat artificial justification, linkage becomes a pol-
icy of expediency, tapping a convenient part of the population in a time
of emergency without an adequate public policy rationale.
The reasonable approach is to recognize the inherent appeal of
linkage in the short term, but to look for more sound alternatives in the
long run. These alternatives should seek to tap some of the underlying
assumptions and potential public support of linkage. The forces that
have propelled linkage so far indicate a new direction in American
public policy: a willingness to consider recapturing some of the wind-
fall in land values and real estate development. Perhaps this is a good
time to allow the windfall-recapture genie out of the exactions bottle,
and to encourage overt public discussion on this issue. The refrained
policy could take many alternative shapes, and could draw on the ex-
periences of other countries.117 But in whatever form it takes, future
policy should be more comprehensive than linkage, and should have a
stronger foundation.
117. See R. Alterman, Land Value Recapture" Design and Evaluation ofAlternative
Policies, Occasional Paper No. 25, Center for Human Settlement (1982).
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APPENDIX A
Mandatory and Quasi-Mandatory Programs-Proposed or Enacted:
(including combined mandatory and bonus-based programs)
San Francisco-see Text.
Boston-see Text.
Chicago: Chicago has had a mandatory linkage policy on its public
and political agenda. The late Mayor Washington had a linkage pro-
gram on his election platform, and it was included in the city's 1984
development plan. The issue has been hotly debated.118 In September
1985, the Advisory Committee on Linked Development submitted a
report recommending that a Linked Development Program, conceived
in broad terms, should be instituted. It would tap downtown real es-
tate in several ways to benefit housing and economic development in
the neighborhoods.
One method proposed for financing such a program is an exaction
fee on new office space. The mandatory fee would be charged on office
space of more than 50,000 square feet at $10 per square foot, with $2
charged when a building permit is issued, and the balance spread over
4 years. The money collected would be used for low and moderate
income housing. The report does not discuss a construction option.
Another suggestion was to overhaul the city's zoning bonus system
of additional densities to allow for contributions to the Linked Devel-
opment Program. It is unclear from the report whether the intention
was that the contributions would be for purposes other than housing
(economic development) or for housing as well, paralleling the sug-
gested mandatory program. In the interim, the committee recom-
mended that developers be encouraged to provide technical assistance,
develop joint ventures with neighborhood organizations, or donate fees
in exchange for bonuses.119
Princeton, N.J.: In response to the requirements under the Mount
Laurel II decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the municipality
adopted an ordinance in 1984 requiring all developers of nonresidential
projects of any size to make cash contributions of $3.39 per square foot
of space, from the first square foot. No indication was included on how
118. Interview with Mr. Charles Thurow, Deputy Commission of Planing, Chi-
cago City Hall, October, 1986. Subsequent telephone conversation, February, 1987.
119. Draft Majority Report of the Advisory Committee on Linked Development,
presented by the Mayor of Chicago (Mayor Washington), September, 1985; provided by
Mr. Thurow.
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the funds should be used. 1 20
Palo Alto, Cal.: In 1984, an ordinance was adopted requiring new
commercial and industrial developments either to contribute $2.43 per
square foot to a city housing fund, or to sponsor direct construction of
low or moderate income units. Like San Francisco, prior to the ordi-
nance, the city relied on the environmental impact review process to
require developers to mitigate impacts on housing availability. 121
Stamford, Conn.: A proposed amendment to the zoning regulations
was denied in August '1986. It called for a "housing impact payment"
of $6 per square foot above 30,000 square feet of office space, or one
dwelling unit for each 1,000 square feet above the threshold. The re-
jected proposal required a certain percentage of set-aside funds or units
specifically for low rather than moderate income housing (30% in the
fee option and 10% in the construction option).122
Bonus-Based Programs:
Seattle: In 1984, the city adopted a program that allows downtown
office developers an increase in floor/area ratios specifically for hous-
ing. A cash option is available, of $10 or $15.30 per square foot of
bonus space, depending on downtown zone. Bonus levels are higher
for lower income housing than for moderate income. The program
also provides incentives for maintaining existing low and moderate in-
come downtown housing through transfers of development rights and
requirements for replacement of demolished houses. The funds may go
into a housing trust fund, a mortgage assistance program, or to housing
projects initiated by nonprofit groups. 123
New York City-see Text.
Miami: In 1983 and 1985, Miami adopted two special zoning dis-
tricts where and increase in FAR is allowed to a nonresidential build-
ing if it provides affordable housing. One zone calls for off-site
housing, the other for on-site. The formula is 0.15 gross square feet of
affordable off-site housing per square foot of bonus space, and 1 square
120. Porter, Report and Update Sheets, supra note 10; see also Susskind and McMa-
hon, supra note 17, at 204.
121. See Porter, Report and Update Sheets, supra note 10.
122. Legal Notice, City of Stamford, Connecticut. The Zoning Board, in its meet-
ing of July 28, 1986, denied the proposed amendments to the Zoning Regulation made
by the Housing-Linkage Task Force of Stamford. A copy of the notice was provided by
Ms. Carbl Davis.
123. See Porter, 1985 Report and 1987 Update Sheets, supra note 10. Pickman and
Roberts, Tapping Real Estate Markets to Address Housing Needs, 9 N.Y. AFF. 3 (1985).
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foot of concurrently constructed on-site housing (of any price range)
for 1 square foot of bonus space. Affordable housing is defined as 90%
or the median price of new housing in Dade County or rental level of
30% of the gross median Dade County monthly income. An alterna-
tive cash option is allowed, at $4 or $6.67 per square foot of bonus
space, for each of the zones respectively, to be deposited in a city fund
for affordable housing. In the off-site provision zone, housing must be
located within one mile of the district or within an adjacent community
redevelopment area. In the on-site-provision zone, all funds are to be
expended within that zone. 124
Hartford-see Text.
Negotiated Programs: see Text for Jersey City, Cambridge, Mass.,2 '
and a combined mandatory-negotiated program in Santa Monica.
124. Porter, supra note 10. Legislation was supplied courtesy of Ms. Brenda Valla,
Assistant Director of Growth Management Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville.
125. In July 1988, Cambridge approved a bonus-based program. Details were as
yet unavailable as this article was going to press.
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